




Public committees and corporatism: How 
does Iceland compare to Scandinavia?
Stefanía Óskarsdóttir, Associate Professor, Faculty of Political Science, 
University of Iceland
Abstract
This paper compares the number of  corporatist public committees, appointed 
by central government, in Iceland and Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway, Swe-
den). Its main aim is to shed light on where Iceland stands compared to these 
countries in term of  corporatist practices. Scholars view corporatist public 
committees as the core expression of  Scandinavian corporatism and thus well 
suited for the measurement of  corporatism. This study shows that the func-
tional representational channel is an important feature of  Icelandic democracy. 
In Iceland various interest groups are integrated into the democratic process 
of  decision-making and implementation in an institutionalized and privileged 
manner. This is the essence of  corporatism, defined as the institutionalized and 
privileged integration of  organized interests in the preparation and/or imple-
mentation of  public policies. Moreover, the results show that Iceland is today 
much more corporatist than the Scandinavian countries; especially, in terms of  
preparatory corporatism. Already in 1970, it appears that Iceland was more cor-
poratist than Sweden in terms of  the number of  corporatist committees. The 
paper also sheds light on sectoral corporatism in Iceland.
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Introduction
This paper compares the number of  corporatist public committees, appointed by cen-
tral government, in Iceland and Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway, Sweden). Its main aim 
is to shed light on where Iceland stands compared to these countries in term of  cor-
poratist practices. Corporatist public committees are committees, which include at least 
one representative of  interest organizations. Corporatist committees are regarded as the 
main indicator of  corporatism in Scandinavia, defined as the institutionalized and privi-
leged integration of  organized interests in the preparation and implementation of  public 
policies (Christiansen et al. 2010, 27; Rommetvedt 2017, 175). This indicator lends itself  
well to comparative studies on the development of  corporatism over time, as well as 
comparing differences between policy stages and between countries (see below).
Scholars have been researching Scandinavian corporatism for several decades. The 
research indicates that in the international context Scandinavia used to be rather corpo-
ratist, but appears to have become less so in the last three decades (Öberg et al. 2011, 
371-374; Rommetvedt 2017, 177). However, it has also been shown that there are differ-
ences in corporatist practices in Scandinavia. In particular, Christiansen et al. (2010) have 
demonstrated this by using corporatist public committees as an indicator. 
There has been very limited research done on corporatist practices in Iceland. The 
few studies that exit are case studies, drawing some comparisons with other countries 
(e.g. Óskarsdóttir 1995, 1999; Thorhallsson 2010; Jónsson 2014).1 The study presented 
here offers a more comprehensive approach. It does this by applying the same method-
ology and data on Scandinavia, used by Christiansen et al. in a paper called “Varieties 
of  Democracy: Interest Groups and Corporatist Committees in Scandinavian Policy 
Making”, published in Voluntas in 2010.2 In order to make it possible to include Iceland 
in such a comparison it was necessary to collect and analyse data on the number and 
composition of  public committees in Iceland over time. The paper presents data for 
three years. 2017, 1985 and 1970. 
The data on Icelandic public committees in 1970 and 1985 was collected by analysing 
the composition and number of  public committees, listed in the government´s annual 
reports on boards, committees and councils (Fjárlaga- og hagssýslustofnun 1970-1985), 
published in 1969 to 1985. The data on the number and composition of  public com-
mittees in 2017 was collected by visiting the web-sites of  all the Icelandic ministries, and 
with some help from their staff.
The organization of  the paper is as follows. First there is a discussion about the 
meaning of  corporatism. It will be shown that there are two traditions when it comes 
to the study of  corporatism; the political economy tradition and the interest group tra-
ditions that regards corporatism as a variety of  democracy. The approach used in this 
study falls into the latter tradition, bringing some new light on how democracy works 
in Iceland. Later sections turn to comparisons between Iceland and Scandinavia. They 
show that corporatism, measured as the number of  corporatist public committees, is 
today probably the strongest in Iceland of  the Nordic countries. Already in 1970, Ice-




paper also sheds light on corporatism within specific policy sectors (sectoral corporat-
ism) and offers a brief  overview of  the political landscape in which corporatist political 
exchanges take place in Iceland.
1. Corporatism
1.1 Earlier developments
Corporatism has been a contested concept whose meaning has evolved over time. It 
has historical roots in the administrative structures of  some European societies. In ear-
lier times heads of  states periodically convened representatives of  important economic 
groups for consultation on matters of  state policy and taxation, whose advice they could 
either adopt or ignore at their own peril. With the adoption of  democratic principles of  
government, the legislative functions of  the state were taken over by popularly elected 
representatives. Also the selection of  those heading the executive branch of  government 
became democratically controlled through elections, in which political parties usually 
play key roles. Elections, and the control of  political outcomes by elected representa-
tives, are part of  the representational channel of  political influence within democratic 
states. But there are other channels for political influence in democratic political socie-
ties. An important channel is the one of  functional representation. It involves organ-
ized interests, corporations and interest groups in both public policy-making and the 
implementation of  government programs. The configuration and relative importance 
of  these two channels of  political influence are among the features which set democratic 
political systems apart from each other (e.g. Lijphart 1999). 
More than fifty years ago Stein Rokkan (1966) noted that the functional-representa-
tional channel was a distinctive feature of  the Scandinavian political system. This meant 
that crucial decisions regarding the economy were rarely taken within the political parties 
or in Parliament because the central arena of  politics was the corporatist channel (Rom-
metvedt 2017, 171). Many subsequent studies similarly concluded that Scandinavian po-
litical systems should be classified as corporatist ones (e.g. Schmitter 1979; Armingeon 
2002; Lijphart & Crepaz 1991; Lijphart 1999; Siaroff  1999). However, since the 1980s 
Scandinavia has moved into a more pluralist direction (Rommetvedt 2017, 191). This 
change will be the focus of  a later section of  this paper.
In the 1970s Phillipe Schmitter defined corporatism as “a system of  interest repre-
sentation in which the constituent units are organized into a limited number of  singu-
lar, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated 
categories, recognized or licensed (if  not created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing 
certain controls on their selection of  leaders and articulation of  demands and supports” 
(1974, 93-94). Schmitter argued that corporatism should be regarded as a system of  
interest and/or attitude representation, a particular modal or ideal-typical institutional 
arrangement for linking the associational organized interests of  civil society with the 
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possible modern configurations of  interest representation, of  which pluralism is per-
haps the best known alternative (1974, 86). 
Schmitter´s work, initially focused on corporatism in authoritarian countries (Portu-
gal and Brazil). But the need to distinguish corporatist practices in democratic countries 
from those in undemocratic ones, prompted scholars like him to define corporatism in 
such a way that it was also applicable to democratic political systems. However, corpo-
ratism in democratic societies seemed at the time to require a prefix. Thus corporatism 
in democratic societies became alternatively known as neo-corporatism, liberal corpo-
ratism or societal corporatism, to name maybe the most frequently used terms. Current 
literature, however, seems to be comfortable with using simply the term ‘corporatism’.
1.2 Two research traditions
According to Christiansen et al., research on corporatism may roughly be divided into 
two traditions: the political economy tradition and the interest group tradition. They point 
out that in the political economy tradition corporatism is regarded as a variety of  capitalism 
whereas the interest group tradition views corporatism as a particular type of  liberal democ-
racy (2010, 25-26). The core interest of  the political economy school is how coordination 
among important economic actors - labour, capital, and state - takes place in capitalist 
societies. Therefore, scholars working within this tradition tend to focus on corporatism 
at the macro-level, sometimes simply defining corporatism as macro-level policy con-
certation; meaning that representatives of  the state and major interest organizations are 
brought together to seek common ground on contentious issues (co-operation). Related 
to this, they study the way economic interests are organized, how they interact with state 
actors, and the effects of  these variables on macro-economic performance. They also 
focus on certain structural variables (such as union membership, the strength of  peak or-
ganizations, the degree of  centralization of  wage bargaining, the strength of  state actors, 
etc.) as well as on certain process variables (bargaining, concertation, type of  relations be-
tween business, labour, and the state), which are then related to certain outcomes (such as 
economic flexibility, strike activity, unemployment and inflation, dispersion of  wages, etc.) 
(Christiansen et al., 2010, 25-26). The opposite of  corporatism in the political economy 
tradition is pluralistic bargaining, disorganized capitalism, or liberal market economies.
The other tradition, the interest group tradition, sees corporatism as part of  liberal 
democracy rather than capitalism. Here the focus is on the workings of  democracy 
and political processes involving the state and interest groups, interest organizations 
and corporations. Viewed through this lens, corporatism is the opposite of  pluralism 
(Schmitter 1974; Rommetvedt 2003, 2005), the numerical channel of  democratic repre-
sentation (Rokkan 1966), or parliamentary democracy and legalism (Hermansson et al. 
1999) (Christiansen et al. 2010, 26). Lijphart´s (1999) classification of  democracies is a 
clear example of  this tradition. To him corporatism is an essential part of  consensual 
democracy, which differs from majoritarian democracy in its reliance on coalition build-
ing and power sharing. Others have asserted that corporatism is an inseparable attribute 




The political economy tradition dominated early studies of  corporatism; typically 
focusing on either incomes policies or industrial policies. It was also broadly assumed 
that corporatism involved a fusion, within a closed relationship, of  the processes of  
interest representation and policy implementation. In other words, it was believed that 
within the corporatist framework privileged interest organizations participate both in 
policy preparation/formulation as well as in policy implementation (Christiansen et al. 
2010, 26-27). Empirical research has, however, shown that this is not necessarily the 
case. Thus it is quite possible to have more corporatism in policy formulation and less 
in implementation or vice versa.3
The macro-level political economy approach has also been criticized for being over-
ly static and therefore unsuitable for understanding how corporatism may evolve over 
time. In a review article on the evolution of  the concept of  corporatism, Molina and 
Rhodes (2002) argued that an “excessively structural-functionalist interpretation of  cor-
poratism led many wrongly to predict its demise as a form of  policy making, and that 
an understanding of  its persistence and new manifestations today must resurrect and 
strengthen some early, recently neglected insights into processes of  political exchange” 
(Molina & Rhodes 202, 305). Citing the works of  Lehmbruch (1984), Regini (1984) and 
others, they maintained that corporatism is best understood as a process of  political 
exchange where organized interest groups are integrated into the public policy-making 
process (Molina & Rhodes 2002, 321). 
When treated as a form of  an integrated political exchange, corporatism becomes a 
variable, which can change over time and is not restricted to certain policy fields. This 
is important, according to Molina and Rhodes, because “there exists an array of  cor-
poratist phenomena, ranging from the intensive to the extensive and from the highly to 
the weakly integrated, encompassing manifestations that are horizontally inclusive or 
exclusive and vertically shallow or deep. Particular instances of  corporatism do not re-
main static; they evolve along these dimensions, as witnessed by developments in many 
European countries over the past decade or so” (Molina & Rhodes 2002, 324).
Corporatism, understood in terms of  an exchange relationship, is not confined to the 
labour market and negotiations on wages, profits, and economic policy. This has been 
borne out by empirical research, which has shown that corporatism may be found in any 
policy area and it may also change over time; showing that corporatism, like pluralism, 
is a continuous variable that is subject to changes over time (Rommetvedt 2017, 174). 
The political exchange nature of  corporatism is further elaborated by Öberg et al. 
(2011). They view corporatism as a type of  political exchange that takes place in institu-
tionalized arenas in which each actor controls resources that the others desire. As such 
it can take place in a multitude of  policy areas. A corporatist exchange assumes that 
organizations control internal opinions, while the state controls authoritative decision-
making. “An exchange does not need to be symmetrical (however defined), but it can 
be realized only when the state offers policies of  interest to the organizations which, in 
return, provide tacit consent, approval or active support of  government policy that is of  
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1.3 Democratic integration
Scholars who study corporatism as a variety of  democracy (exchange relationship) are 
specifically looking into how interest groups are integrated into the democratic process 
of  decision-making and implementation. Accordingly, Christiansen et al. (2010) main-
tain that in functional or institutional terms, the central and minimal characteristic of  
corporatism is the integration of  certain organized interests into the policy process. Ac-
cordingly, they define corporatism as the institutionalized and privileged integration of  organized 
interests in the preparation and implementation of  public policies (Christiansen et al. 2010, 27). 
The definition focuses attention on the integration of  organized interest in the 
democratic process of  preparing and implementing policy. The authors point out that 
the presence of  corporatism does not mean that relations between partners are always 
harmonious and without political conflicts. “The integration may be associated with 
process attributes like bargaining, compromising, or concertation. But even these attrib-
utes cannot be taken for granted. Negotiations may break down, compromises may be 
impossible, and concertation may never result” (Christiansen et al. 2010, 27). 
Following the classical understanding of  corporatism, their definition clearly em-
phasizes the institutional nature of  the interest intermediation process as well as the 
privileged access of  a limited number of  interest organizations. Accordingly, corporat-
ism can be recognized by the fact that it is institutionalized and has been set up by the 
authorities. But once it has been established the initiative for action can be taken both by 
interest organizations as well as by public authorities. The definition also emphasizes the 
importance of  distinguishing between the separate phases of  the policy process - policy 
preparation and implementation. This is important because corporatism may be found 
in several phases of  the policy process, but not necessarily in all phases at the same time. 
Finally, their definition also takes into account that corporatism may be found in any 
policy area (Christiansen et al. 2010, 27). 
2. Corporatist public committees
2.1 Public committees as a measure of corporatism
Based on the definition of  corporatism as the institutionalized and privileged integration 
of  organized interests in the preparation and implementation of  public policies, corpo-
ratism is institutionalized, has been set up by the authorities and involves the privileged 
access of  a limited number of  interest organizations. In Scandinavia public committees 
and commissions with interest group representation have been seen as the foremost 
institutional expression, and therefore the best indicator, of  corporatism (Christiansen 
et al. 2010, 29; Rommetvedt 2017, 175). 
Access to public committees is a formalized tool of  interaction between groups and 
government actors. Public committees are highly institutionalized, having room for a 
limited number of  members, and consequently only some privileged organizations can 
be represented. Some of  the public committees are appointed on a temporary basis 




organizations, civil servants, experts and sometimes politicians (Rommetvedt 2017, 174-
175). 
One of  the drawbacks of  using public committees as an indicator of  corporatism, 
according to Christiansen et al., is that it only measures formal corporatism and not the 
informal connections and ties. However, they find this to be a minor problem because 
“formal and informal corporatism tend to go together if  they do not correlate perfectly” 
(Christiansen et al. 2010, 29). Thus they point out that groups with membership in 
public committees are generally better equipped to affect political decisions. The second 
drawback is that, certainly, not all public committees are equally important. However, 
Christiansen et al. believe that this problem is overcome by looking at the number of  
corporatist public committees across policy sectors, as well as over time. In that way it is 
possible to see trends over time and between countries; trends which can be backed by 
case studies. They point out that with Danish data, “public committees as the indicator 
of  corporatism has been shown to correlate nicely with other measures of  corporatism” 
(Christiansen et al. 2010, 28-30). To sum up, by using public committees as an indicator 
of  corporatism facilitates comparisons across countries, time periods and policy fields. 
Case studies focusing on selected policy sectors are unable to achieve this, according to 
Christiansen et al. Case studies cannot, for example, answer the question to what extent 
the selected cases are representative for the general development in corporatist policy 
making (Christiansen et al. 2010, 28).
Public committees are considered to be corporatist if  they include at least one rep-
resentative of  an interest organization (Christiansen et al. 2010; Rommetvedt 2017). 
This includes all types of  interest organizations, not only representatives of  unions or 
employers´ associations. This is important because in the interest group tradition the 
aim is to understand how interest groups are integrated into the public policy-making 
process. Empirical research has shown, for example, that public interest groups and 
groups representing users of  welfare services are also participants in corporatist institu-
tions (Binderkrantz & Christiansen 2015, 6).
In the next section we turn to the comparison of  corporatist public committees in 
Iceland and Scandinavia; relying on the definition of  corporatism offered by Christian-
sen et al. (2010) as well as their general methodology.
2.2 Corporatist public committees in Iceland and Scandinavia
For non-Icelandic readers it should be noted that Iceland is a very small state, with a 
population of  about 350.000. Before it got home rule in 1904, Iceland was an integral 
part of  the Danish administrative system. After it became a sovereign state in 1918 its 
developing administrative and legal systems remained influenced by this historical lega-
cy. In the century that has since passed state capacities have grown. Today Iceland has a 
well-developed welfare state providing extensive services to its population. The national 
public administrative system is organized around a dozen or so government ministries 
as well as various state institutions and enterprises. 
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mittees, councils and boards appointed by central government (hereafter public com-
mittees). These public committees serve various functions; including preparing and ad-
vising on policy, implementing policy, granting licenses and certifications, adjudicating, 
distributing grants or other financial resources and governing public institutions. Al-
ready at the end of  WWII Iceland had a relatively large number of  public committees. 
Thus in 1948 it had more than 150 public committees appointed by central government 
(Guðmundsson 1949, 3). In 1970 the number of  public committees had grown to 371, 
to 465 in 1975 and to 548 in 1980. The number of  public committees continued to rise 
in Iceland until 2000 when there were 910 public committees. In 2005 the number was 
800 and by the end of  2017 Iceland had 603 public committees.
In comparison, Denmark had 622 public committees in 1965, appointed by central 
government. In 1975 there were 640 public committees and 425 in 1980. However, in 
2005 the number of  Danish public committees was down to 204 committees (Christian-
sen et al. 2010, 31-33). 
According to Thesen and Rommetvedt, Norway had 954 public committees in 1966 
but this number also included committees appointed by local and regional authorities 
(Thesen & Rommetvedt 2009, 39). There is no data available for the number of  Norwe-
gian public committees, appointed only by central government prior to 1983, but in that 
year there were 401 Norwegian public committees, appointed by central government. By 
2005 the number was down to 153 public committees (Christiansen et al. 2010, 31-33). 
Like in Denmark and Norway, the number of  public committees has also declined over 
time in Sweden. However, the number of  Swedish public committees was never as high 
as it was in Norway and Denmark. In 1970 Sweden had 217 Swedish public committees, 
280 in 1980, 264 in 1990 and 192 in 2004 (Christiansen et al. 2010, 31-33).
Over half  of  all public committees in Denmark in the 1960s and 1970s were cor-
poratist. This ratio rose somewhat with the dwindling number of  public committees. 
Nevertheless, the total number of  corporatist public committees also declined until the 
1990s when their number stabilized. In 1975 Denmark had 368 corporatist public com-
mittees, 230 in 1985, 156 in 1990 and 166 in 2005.4
The same development occurred in Norway; with a dwindling number of  public 
committees, the ones that were appointed were more likely to include representatives of  
interest organizations. According to Christiansen et al. (2010), Norway had 281 corpo-
ratist public committees in 1983, 218 in 1993 and 94 in 2005 (Christiansen et al. 2010, 
31-33). In Sweden, on the other hand, the drop in the number of  corporatist public 
committees meant that the public committees that remained in place were less likely 
than before to include representatives of  organized interests (see Table 1). Sweden had 





Table 1. Number of all public committees and public committees with 
representation from interest organisations by selected years and countries




with i.o. 154 368 87




with i.o. 193 230 281 121
1990 562 204 317
(1993)
264
with i.o. n/a 156 218 68
2005 800 204 153 192
(2004)
with i.o. n/a 
(266+)
166 94 60
2017 603 n/a n/a n/a
with i.o. 296 n/a n/a n/a
The numbers for Denmark, Sweden and Norway are found in Christiansen et al. 2010, 31-33.
In Iceland, by contrast, there are now both more public committees, as well as corporat-
ist public committees, than there were in 1970 and 1985. At the end of  2017 there were 
296 corporatist public committees in Iceland, compared to about 154 in 1970 and 193 in 
1985. In 2017 almost half  of  all public committees included representatives of  interest 
organization, whereas in 1970 a little over 40% of  public committees included repre-
sentatives of  interest organizations, but only a third of  the committees in 1985 appears 
to have had interest representation. 
The newest available published numbers for Scandinavia are from 2004/2005. For 
these years we do not yet have comparable data for Iceland. However, an educated guess 
would be that Iceland may have had somewhere between 266 to 400 corporatist public 
committees, given that there were 800 public committees at the time. This guess assumes 
that no less than a third of  the 800 committees, and maybe as many as a half  of  them, 
included representatives of  organized interests. Even the lower number means that Ice-
land had in all likelihood many more corporatist public committees than Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden at the same time.
To sum up. The numbers presented in this section show that Iceland appears to 
have become the most corporatist of  the Nordic countries in the new century, using the 
measure of  corporatist public committees. Already in 1970 Iceland was more corporat-
ist than Sweden. Then Iceland had some 154 corporatist committees compared to 87 
corporatist Swedish committees. Also, by 1985 Iceland was not so far behind Norway 
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section, the attention is turned to the question of  how Iceland compares to the Scandi-
navian countries in terms of  the number of  corporatist preparatory and implementation 
public committees. As was mentioned earlier in this paper, Christiansen et al. (2010) 
find it useful to differentiate between preparatory public committees and implementing 
public committees in order to get a more nuanced picture of  corporatist practices and 
how they develop over time (Christiansen et al. 2010).  
2.3 Preparatory and implementation corporatism
Preparatory committees are those committees that among other things provide advice 
and help prepare policy and legislative initiatives, while implementation committees in-
clude boards, councils, commissions and committees responsible for distributing public 
goods and services and making other authoritative decisions. Implementation commit-
tees are likely to have a formalized and delimited authority to make public decisions. 
By differentiating between the two types of  public committees, Christiansen et al. 
were able to detect different patterns in the Scandinavian countries. They showed that 
the preparation of  policy through corporatist bodies has declined significantly in Den-
mark and Norway since the 1970s and 1980s. In Sweden, however, it was never a wide-
spread practice to assign the preparation of  policy to corporatist public committees. 
This is one of  the interesting findings of  their comparative study. Their results also 
demonstrated that implementation corporatism declined significantly in Norway after 
1980, but less so in Sweden. Finally, another interesting finding of  Christiansen et al. 
is that implementation corporatism is as widespread in Denmark today as it was in the 
1980s, although it declined significantly during the 1970s (Christiansen et al. 2011, 33). 
When we look at the numbers for Iceland we see a different trend. In Iceland the 
number of  preparatory corporatist public committees has increased since the 1970s 
and 1980. Moreover, there are now more corporatist preparatory committees in Iceland 
than there were in the Scandinavia countries during their heydays of  corporatism. This 
is illustrated in Table 2. In 1970 Iceland had 54 corporatist preparatory committees, 
compared to 21 in Sweden and 156 in Denmark (1975) (data is not available for Norway 
for this time). In 1985 Norway had 36 corporatist preparatory committees compared to 
67 such committees in Iceland and 117 in Denmark. There are no numbers for Sweden 
available for that year. However, in 1990 Sweden had only 6 corporatist preparatory 
committees (Christiansen et al. 2010, 31). Finally, in 2005 Denmark had only 39 corpo-
ratist preparatory public committees, whereas Sweden (2004) and Norway had 13 and 
12 respectively.5 In comparison, Iceland had 180 corporatist preparatory committees 
in 2017, which again is a larger number of  such committees than Denmark had in the 
1970s.6 Moreover, as Table 2 shows, already in 1985 Iceland had more corporatist pre-
paratory committees than Norway and Sweden.
The numbers for Scandinavia in Table 2 clearly indicate that corporatist prepara-
tory committees are now somewhat rare in Scandinavia. This is consistent with a series 
of  qualitative studies, which have documented that “corporatist arrangements are not 




less privileged role (Blom-Hansen 2001; Christiansen & Klitgaard 2010; Klitgaard & 
Nørgaard 2014)” (Binderkrantz & Christiansen 2015, 9). Again, this is not the case in 
Iceland, which now has many more corporatist preparatory committees than it did in 
both 1970 and 1985.
 
Table 2. Number of preparatory public committees etc. with members from 
interest organizations in selected years
Year Denmark Norway Sweden Iceland
1970/1975 156 21 54
1985 117 36 n/a 67
2004/2005 39 12 13 n/a
2017 180
Figures for Denmark, Norway and Sweden are from Christiansen et al. 2010, 31. 
A closer look at implementation corporatism shows that Iceland has about as many 
implementation corporatist public committees in 2017 as it had in 1970, around 100 
committees. In Norway the number was down from 204 in 1984 to 82 in 2005. Denmark 
had 127 corporatist implementation committees in 2005 compared to 212 in 1970.7 In 
Sweden the number was down to 47 compared to 66 in the 1970s. According to this, 
Sweden now stands out with relatively few implementation corporatist public commit-
tees. Denmark, on the other hand, has the greatest number, followed by Iceland and 
Norway (see Table 3).
Table 3. Interest group representation on implementation bodies (agency boards, 
committees, etc.) by selected years
Year Denmark Norway Sweden Iceland
1970/1975 212 n/a 66 100
1985 113 204 n/a 126
2004/2005 127 82 47 n/a
2017 101
Figures for Denmark, Norway and Sweden before 2010 are from Christiansen et al. 2010, 33. 
To sum up. The numbers for Iceland show that the preparation of  policy through cor-
poratist bodies has increased significantly in Iceland since 1970/1985 while the number 
of  corporatist implementation committees remains similar to then. In 1970 Iceland had 
almost twice as many implementation committees as it had preparatory committees 
(100/54). But in 2017 this had changed. Then it had 180 corporatist preparatory com-
mittees, compared to 101 corporatist implementation committees and 15 corporatist 
committees that did both. In other words, the growth in the number of  Icelandic cor-
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number of  corporatist preparatory committees. Prior to the 1990s, Denmark also had 
many more corporatist preparatory committees than implementation committees. Such 
committees have now become rare in Scandinavia as this section has demonstrated.
2.4 Institutionalization of Icelandic public committees 
A third of  all Icelandic public committees in 2017 are required by law, regulations or 
agreements to include representatives of  interest organization. Moreover, a great major-
ity of  the corporatist public committees were required to do so; namely, 204 out of  the 
296 corporatist public committees. However, there are interesting differences between 
corporatist public committees depending on whether they were involved with policy 
preparation or implementation. Thus all but two of  the corporatist implementation 
public committees were legally required to include representatives of  interest organiza-
tions, compared to a little over a half  of  the corporatist preparatory public committees. 
These numbers are a clear indication of  the institutionalization of  corporatist practices 
in Iceland. 
However, the large number of  ad hoc (short term) corporatist preparatory public 
committees is also interesting. It suggests that ministers/ministries find it useful to in-
clude representatives of  organized interests on such committees, even though they are 
not required to do so by laws, regulations or agreements. This in turn is evidence of  the 
fact that organized interests have resources that give them power to engage in corporat-
ist exchanges with the state. It also shows a general willingness to participate in corporat-
ist political exchanges (see more later).
In 1970 36% of  all Icelandic public committees were based on laws or resolutions 
passed by Parliament (Alþingi). In 1975 the percentage was 34%, 31% in 1980 and 35% 
in 1985 (Kristinsson 1994, 105). Unlike the figures for 2017, these numbers do not tell 
us how many of  the committees were legally required to include representatives of  or-
ganized interests. However, Kristinsson (1994) offers some partial answers to this ques-
tion by pointing out differences between ministries in terms of  legal requirements to 
include representatives of  interest organizations. Thus in 1989-1990, ministers heading 
ministries concerned with industry and production were obligated to appoint interest 
group representatives to more than 60% of  the public committees to which they ap-
pointed members.8 Next came ministers, heading public service ministries. They were 
required to appoint interest representatives to about 50% of  the public committees to 
which they appointed members. The corresponding figure for ministers, heading min-
istries concerned with the co-ordination of  public affairs, was about 30% (Kristinsson 
1994, 108-110). These are interesting differences that point towards the prevalence of  
corporatism in certain sectors. In the next chapter, attention is turned to sectoral corpo-
ratism in Iceland and its evolution over time.
2.5 Sectoral corporatism in Iceland
Empirical research has shown that corporatism can be found in any policy area. This 




this by showing the percentage of  corporatist public committees within particular gov-
ernmental ministries as well as their absolute numbers. Both are good indicators of  the 
existence of  sectoral corporatism.
In 1970 the highest percentage of  corporatist committees was to be found among 
those appointed by the minister of  social affairs (64%), followed by the Ministry of  the 
Prime Minister (58%)9. Next came the Ministry of  Commerce (50%); Ministry of  the 
Fisheries (47%); Ministry of  Agriculture (47%) and the Ministry of  Education (43%), 
which both then and later had the highest number of  public committees. The smallest 
percentage of  corporatist public committees in 1970 was found within the Ministry of  
Transportation/Communications (15%) and the Ministry of  Industry (24%). 
In 1985 the Ministry of  the Fisheries had become the most corporatist in terms of  
the percentage of  public committees with interest representation. Then 73% of  pub-
lic committees appointed by the minister of  the fisheries were corporatist. Next came 
public committees under the Ministry of  Social Affairs (58%); then public commit-
tees under the Ministry of  Agriculture (45%); public committees under the Ministry of  
Transportation (43%); and public committees under the Ministry of  Health and Social 
Insurance (42%). The least corporatist appointments were to be found at the Ministry 
of  Industry (10%); the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs (11%); and the Ministry of  the Prime 
Minister (16%). However, only about 1/3 of  the numerous (162) public committees of  
the Ministry of  Education were corporatist at the time.
In absolute terms, the highest number of  corporatist public committees in both 
1970 and 1985 was found within the Ministry of  Education; 44 compared to 52 in 1985. 
Next came the Ministry of  Social Affairs with 27 corporatist public committees in 1970, 
while the Ministry of  the Fisheries had 14 corporatist public committees. In 1985 the 
Ministry of  the Fisheries was in second place, with 24 corporatist committees. Next 
came the Ministry of  Health and Social Security with 22 corporatist public committees, 
followed by the Ministry of  Social Affairs that had 21 corporatist public committees. In 
1985 the Ministry of  Agriculture had 13 corporatist public committees, compared to 7 
in 1970.
How are these numbers today? Icelandic ministries were reorganized in 2012. In-
stead of  separate ministries of  the fisheries, agriculture and industry the ministries were 
merged into only one ministry, the Ministry of  Industry and Innovation. In 2017, 53% 
of  the public committees of  the new Ministry of  Industry and Innovation (Atvinnu- og 
nýsköpunarráðuneytið) included members of  interest organizations. The highest percent-
age of  corporatist public committees in 2017 was, however, found among public com-
mittees appointed by the minister of  transportation and local government (63%), fol-
lowed closely by the Ministry of  the Environment and Natural Resources (60%). Next 
come the Ministry of  Health and Welfare (57%) the Ministry of  Industry and Innova-
tion (53%) and the Ministry of  Education and Culture (46%). The least corporatist are 
the Ministry of  Finance and Economic Affairs (26%), the Ministry of  Justice (30%) and 
the Ministry of  the Prime Minister (38%). 
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in 2017 broken down by ministries. It demonstrates that the highest number of  corpo-
ratist public committees in 2017 was found within the Ministry of  Education and Cul-
ture (90), followed by the Ministry of  Health and Welfare (66) and the Ministry of  In-
dustry and Innovation (47). Interestingly, this is not so different from what was already 
the case in 1970 and the 1985. Therefore, it may be concluded that the most corporatist 
policy sectors in Iceland are, and have been, those that deal with public services (educa-
tion, health and social affairs including local government) and the traditional industries 
(agriculture and the fisheries.10
Table 4. Number of Icelandic public committees at the end of 2017, by ministry 
and composition
Ministry Corporatist Expert/Admin
Industry and Innovation 47 39
Justice 12 24
Prime Minister 5 8
Transportation and local government 24 10
Environment and natural resources 34 23
Health and Welfare 66 46
Education and Culture 90 104
Finance and Economic Affairs 15 42
Foreign Affairs 2 0
Total 296 296
It is, for example, interesting that of  the 47 corporatist public committees working for 
the Ministry of  Industry and Innovation in 2017, 22 committees included representa-
tives from the Icelandic Association of  Farmers (Bændasamtök Íslands). This is a clear 
indication of  the strong position this interest organization has within the ministry. Also, 
8 of  its corporatist committees included representatives of  the Iceland Fisheries (Samtök 
fyrirtækja í sjávarútvegi), which represents the fishing industry. 
Finally, Table 4 also shows the number of  public committees which included only 
“experts”. In 2017 there were as many such “expert committees” as committees with 
representatives of  interest organizations. “Experts” are individuals who appear to be 
chosen to sit on public committees due to their qualifications and expertise. They work 
either within the ministries, at other government institutions or come from the outside 
of  the government. Such experts may have close ties to their field of  expertise, but they 
are not representing that field directly. Likewise, representatives of  interest organiza-
tions may also be “experts” but they sit on committees as representatives of  their or-
ganizations. The Ministry of  Education, followed by the Ministry of  Health and Welfare 
and the Ministry of  Finance and Economic Affairs, had the highest number of  “expert” 




3. The corporatist context
The findings of  this paper show that corporatism is relatively robust in Iceland today 
compared to Scandinavia. Although it is outside the scope of  this paper to investigate 
what explains the prevalence of  corporatism in Iceland, the interesting findings warrant 
a brief  explanation of  what might be the contributing factors. Öberg et al. (2011), pro-
vide a useful framework for understanding the context of  corporatism. As was noted 
earlier in this paper, they view corporatism as a type of  political exchange that takes 
place in institutionalized arenas in which each actor controls resources that the others 
desire. The exchanges between the state and organized interests require that one party is 
in control of  resources in which the other is interested. A corporatist exchange assumes 
that interest organizations control internal opinions, while the state controls authorita-
tive decision-making (Öberg et al. 2011, 367). Moreover, interest organizations usually 
have within their ranks a wide range of  expertise pertinent to solving problems at hand. 
According to Öberg et al. (2011), a corporatist political exchange (corporatism) re-
quires the state, as well as interest organizations, to have a strong mandate to engage in 
exchanges. It also presupposes a high degree of  unity, mobilization of  relevant assets 
and corporatist-friendly attitudes on both sides of  the exchange. “Without these fea-
tures, actors are not trustworthy exchange partners” (Öberg et al. 2011, 368). Mandate 
means that the state has the ability to control legislation at central government level 
(sovereignty), whereas for interest groups it means that they have to be accepted as the 
representative of  that specific interest. Unity refers to the ability of  the government 
to gather support from a parliamentary majority, while interest groups have to be suf-
ficiently cohesive to represent their members effectively. Such a unity it important be-
cause both parties “must retain a capacity for making binding commitments if  credible 
exchange is to take place” (Öberg et al. 2011, 368). 
The partners, respectively, also need to possess relevant assets. Even a cohesive and 
united government, as Öberg et al. point out, will be constrained in its ability to offer 
favourable and credible policy deals when it is under economic pressure. Similarly, an in-
terest group must be able to mobilize members who are willing to support leadership de-
cisions made in corporatist exchanges and, ultimately, to back the government involved. 
Finally, leaders on all sides need to share some commitment to corporatist practices 
(Öberg et al. 2011, 369). The authors maintain that the weakening of  the mandate, unity, 
assets and underlying values explain the decline of  corporatist practices in Scandinavia. 
This appears not to have been the case in Iceland so far. The great number of  Ice-
landic public committees, which include members of  interest organizations, suggests 
that both the government as well as interest organizations find it useful to engage in 
corporatist exchanges; a fact which further fuels the will to engage in such exchanges. 
Moreover, this also suggests that the partners involved are perceived to have the man-
date and the necessary means (unity, assets) to engage in corporatist exchanges leading 
to favourable results.  
Looking first at the state and what it brings to the table; the government controls 
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parliamentary majority. Striking political bargains with the Opposition is usually not 
required in order to pass legislation, since minority governments are the exception. Re-
search has also shown that party cohesion, like in other parliamentary systems, is high 
within Parliament (Alþingi) (Kristinsson 2011; Indriðason & Kristinsson 2015). Govern-
ment legislative proposals and policies are therefore very likely to have the backing of  
the parliamentary majority supporting the government. This minimizes the influence of  
the Opposition on policy-making. Nevertheless, any government values securing societal 
and political support for policy initiatives and implementation. Both may be achieved by 
involving interest groups in the policy process (preparation and implementation). For 
this reason, the functional channel of  representation comes into play; not least because 
major interest groups in Iceland represent large segments of  society (see more below).
Limited administrative capacities may also enhance the attractiveness, for the gov-
ernment, of  engaging in corporatist exchanges. Iceland has a very small public admin-
istration, relating to the fact that it has a very small population. Yet, it has to perform 
many of  the same tasks as larger public bureaucracies do but with fewer resources. 
Therefore, from the vantage point of  the government it makes sense to extent its capaci-
ties by involving interest groups, and experts working on their behalf, in the preparation 
and implementation of  policy. This practice makes it, for example, unnecessary to per-
manently employ more experts. In modern day Scandinavia, the capacities of  the public 
administration have expanded, thus reducing the need to involve outside experts on an 
ad hoc basis. Iceland also sets itself  apart from its Scandinavian counterparts in that it 
has only two levels of  government; the national and local levels with no regional level. 
Moreover, Iceland like Norway remains outside of  the European Union, although both 
are members of  the European Economic Area. 
It is likely, that the differences in the size of  the bureaucracy, as well as some differ-
ences in the organization of  the administrative system, may in some ways contribute to 
the fact that Iceland has today far more corporatist public committees than its Scandina-
vian counterparts. But without large and well organized interest organisations, corporat-
ist exchanges would be fruitless. In this regard, Iceland ranks high. It has a number of  
major, well organized interest groups that have representational monopoly, turning them 
into important political players. For example, the unionization of  Icelandic employees is 
one of  the highest in the world. Over 80% of  employees are members of  trade unions, 
compared to less than 70% in Denmark and Sweden and 55% in Norway. The high 
union density in Iceland is the result of  the widely enforced system of  closed shop. It 
ensures that jobs and welfare benefits, such as unemployment benefits, sick leaves and 
parental leaves, are secured through union membership. Finally, Icelandic trade unions 
are organized according to craft rather than sectors, which gives them a reach across 
various industrial sectors. 
Although the right to bargain rests with individual unions, the Icelandic Confedera-
tion of  Labour (ASÍ) has a strong position within the labour movement. According to its 
website, its „role is to promote the interests of  its constituent federations, trade unions 




employment, social, education, environment and labour market issues. ASI represents 
the trade union movement at various levels of  the government on issues such as labour 
law, employment and social policy, vocational education and training and occupational 
safety” (ASÍ n.d.). The description shows the extensive scope of  the operations of  the 
Icelandic Confederation of  Labour. It is also mirrored by the fact that at the end of  
2017 it had representatives on 52 public committees, appointed by central government. 
Unions in the public sector also have a strong representation on public committees. 
A case in point is the fact that the Icelandic Teachers´ Union (KÍ) was represented on 
22 public committees in 2017, the Federation of  State and Municipal Employees (BSRB) 
was represented on 27 public committees and the Icelandic Confederation of  University 
Graduates (BHM) had representatives on 18 public committees. Interest organizations 
representing welfare recipients, students and parents are also represented on various 
public committees. For example, the Association of  Disabled People (Örykjabandalagið) 
had representatives on 8 public committees in 2017 while the Association of  the Elderly 
(Landssamband eldri borgara) had representation on 5 public committees. 
Employers, for their part, are also well organized and influential. Their main or-
ganization is the Icelandic Confederation of  Enterprise (SA) which includes about 
2000 companies that employ about 70% of  the Icelandic workforce.11 The Icelandic 
Confederation of  Enterprise bargains on the behalf  of  all these companies (SA n.d.). 
Representatives of  the Confederation of  Icelandic Enterprise were found on 61 public 
committees in 2017. Particular sectors within the confederation are well organized as 
well. This includes the Federation of  Icelandic Industries (SI), Fisheries Iceland (SFS), 
the Federation of  Energy and Utility Companies (Samorka) and the Federation of  Tour-
ism (SAF). Each of  these organizations represents the majority of  producers within 
their respective sectors. At the end of  2017 Fisheries Iceland had representatives on 14 
public committees, the Federation of  Energy and Utility Companies had representatives 
on 10 public committees, the Federation of  Tourism had representatives on 9 public 
committees, and the Federation of  Icelandic Industries had representatives on 8 public 
committees etc. 
The Icelandic Farmers ‘Association (Bændasamtök Íslands) is made up of  16 organi-
zations representing farmers in different fields of  agriculture. Until 2017 the state im-
posed, and collected, a tax (búnaðargjald) on farmers which was used to fund the Icelandic 
Farmers ‘Association and related activities. The practice was yet another indication of  
the strong corporatist ties between the state and the agricultural sector.12 Also, in 2017 
the Icelandic Farmers Association had representatives on 26 public committees. In addi-
tion, its member organizations had representatives on several public committees as well. 
Many more interest organizations are represented on Icelandic public committees. 
Among them are the Icelandic Association of  Municipalities (Samband íslenskra sveitar-
félaga) that has representatives on close to 100 public committees. In comparison, the 
Iceland Nature Conservation Association (Náttúruverndarsamtök Íslands) has representa-
tives on 10 corporatist public committees.
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poratist political exchanges take place in Iceland. There is a rich history of  corporatist 
practices in Iceland still unexplored and undocumented. A further research into this 
history can provide deeper insights for those theorizing about corporatism and demo-
cratic practices. But as the results of  this paper show, the state finds it useful to engage 
major interest organizations in political exchanges in order to secure advice, acceptance 
and compliances to state policies and implementation. Interest organizations, likewise, 
are willing to participate in such exchanges in the hope that it helps promoting their 
interests and goals. The large number of  public committees, appointed by central gov-
ernment, is a clear indication of  the embeddedness of  corporatist practices in Iceland. 
These committees provide the institutional, formal setting for the state and interest 
organizations to engage in political exchanges. Moreover, the great majority of  these 
corporatist committees are set up by laws, regulations or agreements. 
4. Conclusions
Very little comparative research exists on how Iceland compares to other countries 
in terms of  corporatism. The research presented in this paper addressed this lack of  
knowledge by comparing the number of  corporatist public committees, appointed by 
central government, in Iceland and Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway, Sweden), in order 
to determine where Iceland stands in term of  corporatist practices. Corporatist public 
committees are committees, which include at least one representative of  interest organi-
zations. They are regarded as the main indicator of  corporatism in Scandinavia, defined 
as the institutionalized and privileged integration of  organized interests in the prepara-
tion and implementation of  public policies (Christiansen et al. 2010, 27). The definition 
emphasizes the institutional integration of  interest groups into the democratic process. 
The focus on privileged access in the definition also implies that some interest groups 
are given access to the institutionalized corporatist channels while others are excluded. 
Moreover, the distinction between policy formulation and implementation in the defini-
tion opens up for the possibility that the degree of  corporatism may vary between the 
two phases of  the policy process (Rommetvedt 2017, 173). 
The paper was inspired by the study of  Christiansen et al. published in 2010, called 
“Varieties of  Democracy: Interest Groups and Corporatist Committees in Scandinavian 
Policy Making”. In it the authors compared the number of  corporatist public commit-
tees in Denmark, Norway and Sweden from the 1970s until 2004/2005. By using this 
measure, they found that corporatism has declined in Scandinavia in recent decades. But 
they also discovered variations in this development within the individual countries. In 
the past, for example, Sweden used to be less corporatist in terms of  the preparation of  
policy than Denmark and Norway. Also, although preparatory corporatism has almost 
disappeared in Denmark and Norway, implementation corporatism is still relatively ro-
bust in Denmark.
When Iceland is added to the comparisons an interesting picture emerges. Contrary 




than it was in 1970 and 1985. In the new century, Iceland has the greatest number of  
corporatist public committees of  the countries compared. One of  the interesting find-
ings of  this paper is that already in 1970 Iceland was more corporatist, by using the 
indicator of  corporatist public committees, than Sweden. Also, in the mid-1980s Iceland 
was not far behind Denmark and Norway in terms of  the total number of  corporatist 
committees. 
The growth of  Icelandic corporatist public committees, compared to 1970 and 1985, 
is due to the explosion in the number of  corporatist preparatory public committees, 
while the number of  corporatist implementation committees has not changed much. At 
the end of  2017 Iceland had 180 corporatist preparatory public committees, compared 
to 54 in 1970. In this regard, Iceland is in a league by itself  among the other Nordic 
countries included in this study. There, corporatist preparatory committees have mostly 
disappeared. In terms of  implementation corporatism, Denmark probably ranks first 
among the Nordic countries, followed by Iceland. 
All but two of  the corporatist implementation committees in Iceland are required 
by various law, regulations or agreements to include representatives of  interest organi-
zation. The same applies to a little over a half  of  the preparatory corporatist public 
committees.  This may be regarded as a further evidence of  the institutionalized embed-
dedness of  corporatism in Iceland. But likewise, the high number of  ad hoc prepara-
tory committees, that include representatives of  interest organizations, is also a clear 
indication of  the embeddedness of  corporatist practices. Because even though it does 
not have to include such representatives, the state finds it useful, or even necessary, to 
appoint them to committees involved with the various stages of  policy preparation. Re-
calling the arguments made by Öberg et al. (2011), this is likely the result of  the fact that 
various Icelandic interest organizations have the necessary mandate, unity, assets and 
willingness to participate in corporatist exchanges. Corporatist exchanges are, especially, 
likely in the fields of  education, health, social affairs, environmental issues and within 
core industrial sectors such as agriculture and the fisheries. 
On a final note, the study shows that the functional representational channel is an 
important feature of  Icelandic democracy. In Iceland, interest groups are often inte-
grated into the democratic process of  decision-making and implementation in an in-
stitutionalized and privileged manner. This is the essence of  corporatism, defined as 
the institutionalized and privileged integration of  organized interests in the preparation 
and/or implementation of  public policies. 
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Notes
1 Siaroff  (1999) nominally included Iceland in his comparative study of  corporatism in 24 industrial 
democracies, but lacked sufficient information to rank it (Siaroff  1999, 183).
2 Their study offers more historical data than is yet available for Iceland, but their most recent data 
only covers 2004/2005. Newer comparative data on the number of  Scandinavian public committees 
is not available in the literature. 
3 The opposite of  corporatism in policy preparation may be pluralism or the electoral channel of  
representation, whereas classical bureaucracy is the alternative to corporatism in policy implementa-
tion.
4 Binderkrantz and Christiansen (2015, 8), however, found 273 corporatist committees in Denmark 
in 2010. It is not clear whether these are only committees appointed by central government, or not. 
Nevertheless, the number should be mentioned, despite the fact that it is not included in the study 
of  Christiansen et al. (2010).
5 According to Binderkrantz and Christiansen (2015, 9), Denmark had only three corporatist prepara-
tory committees in 2010.
6 In addition, it should be mentioned, that 14 of  the Icelandic corporatist committees were both as-
signed to preparation of  policy and implementation in 2017, see Table 4.
7 Binderkrantz and Christiansen found 270 implementation committees in Denmark in 2010 (Binder-
krantz & Christiansen 2015, 9).
8 Kristinsson (1994) differentiates between interest organizations and local interest groups and mu-
nicipalities. Here in this paper the percentages for these different categories of  interest organiza-
tions are added together.
9 This high percentage is due to several public committees concerned with ensuring full employment 
and labour issues (atvinnumálanefndir). All of  them had representatives from interest organizations. 
In 1985 these types of  public committees had moved to other ministries.
10 Iceland did not have a special Ministry of  the Environment until 1990s so no historical comparison 
is yet possible. But in 2017 this ministry had 34 public committees with interest representation. This 
points to the prevalence of  a corporatist approach within the ministry, which also oversees issues 
relating to natural resources (Umhverfis- og auðlindaráðuneytið).
11 In addition, there is also, for example, the Icelandic Employers´ Federation (Félag atvinnurekenda) that 
represents companies involved in most types of  business and trade, importing, exporting, wholesal-
ing and retail distribution.
12 In the past the state also collected membership dues for other producers’ groups, including the 
Federation of  Icelandic Industries (iðnaðarmálagjald) and the Federation of  Small Boat Owners.  The 
practice was challenged in 2010 when the European Court of  Human Rights ruled that it violated 
the freedom of  association to require firms in industry to pay the tax/dues.
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